Twenty Sixth Distinction

Single Question. Whether Matrimony was Established Immediately by God

1. “Since the other sacraments etc.” [Lombard, Sent. IV d.26 ch.1 n.1].

2. About this twenty sixth distinction I ask whether matrimony was established immediately by God.

3. That it was not:

In Genesis 2.23-24 Adam says, “This now is bone of my bones,” and there follows, “For which cause a man will leave father and mother and will cleave to his wife,” where it is commonly held [Hugh of St. Victor, Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, Richard of Middleton] that matrimony was instituted. And this does the Gloss state there [Gloss on I Corinthians 7.1-7, Nicholas of Lyra], and the Savior alleges it in the Gospel [Matthew 19.4-6]. Therefore, it was not immediately instituted by God.

4. Again, no inferior can change anything about something immediately instituted by God; but the Church changes something about matrimony, because certain persons who would otherwise legitimately contract marriage the Church delegitimizes.

5. The opposite is said by Christ to the Pharisees, Matthew 19.4-6, “Have you not read that he who made man from the beginning made them male and female?” And he said, “For which cause a man will leave father and mother and will cleave to his wife;” and at once adds, “What God has joined together, let not man separate.”

I. To the Question

A. Things Worthy of Note that Need to be Set Down First

1. Five Main Conclusions

6. For the solution of the questions to be treated of concerning matrimony, there are here certain things deserving of note that need to be set down first.

7. And let this be the first main conclusion: it is an honorable thing that male and female are mutually conjoined or obligated to each other in an indissoluble bond, for procreating offspring to be duly educated.

8. Second conclusion: it is an honorable thing that male and female mutually hand over to each other in their perpetuity the power of their own bodies for procreating offspring to be duly educated.

9. Third conclusion: it is fitting that this mutual giving was instituted and approved by God, and so was it done.

10. Fourth conclusion: it is fitting that to this contract of mutual giving some sacrament was annexed, and so was it done.

11. The fifth conclusion is: in matrimony many distinct things (and which things) come together.

2. Proof of the Main Conclusions

a. Double Proof of the First Main Conclusion

α. First Proof

12. For proof of the first conclusion [n.7] let this be the first prior conclusion: that man want to procreate offspring in the human species is an act capable of being circumstanced with the right circumstances. And the proof is that the act is not per se evil such that it be incapable of being rightly circumstanced (such as is ‘to give what is another’s’).

13. This is plain:

First because it is not more contrary to right reason or inclination of nature that man preserves his species than that any other animals save their own; indeed, it is the more according to inclination the more this species is more perfect; but this species cannot as a rule be preserved save through offspring.

Next second because, although man was to be immortal yet it was to belong to him, according to the right inclination of nature, to communicate his species in the way in which it was to be possible for him, that is, by propagating.

Next third, from matters of belief, because a precept is not given about anything illicit, but in Genesis 1.28 before the Fall, and in Genesis 9.7 to Noah and his sons after the Fall, a precept is given about propagation: “Increase and multiply.”

Next fourth because, according to right reason resting on faith, it is not evil but honorable to act, according to divine predestination, for the repair of angelic ruin and of the heavenly city Jerusalem; but the elect, predestined for the repair of that ruin, are not commonly produced save by propagation;     therefore etc     .

14. So therefore does it appear that the act is not of itself evil; therefore, it is either of itself good or is capable of being well circumstanced.

15. But that it is not of itself sufficiently good with moral goodness the proof is that no ‘to will’ is of itself good from the fact that it focuses on an object morally good, unless it focus on an object that is in itself something to will, that is, that is simply the ultimate good. This ‘to will’ is to love God, where it cannot be against right reason, rather it is necessarily according to right reason, that such act tend to such object. But this is because this object is the ultimate end to be willed according to itself by anyone ordered to an end in the way of being able to love that end. For a man can rightly or not rightly make a distinction about everything that is for the end, because he can do so either by ordering it to God and thus use it, or by not ordering it and so enjoy it, which is a great sin.

16. But the good on which focuses this act (which is procreation or wanting to procreate offspring) is plainly not the ultimate end but only something ordered or orderable to the ultimate end; therefore such an act is not of itself sufficiently good morally; therefore it is capable of being well circumstanced [sc. so as to be morally good].

17. Again, both facts, namely that this act is not of itself good and not morally bad, can be proved by one argument: because only that act is of itself bad whose object it is repugnant to that the act is good, or whose object is repugnant to the goodness of the act, or which act is repugnant to the agent according to natural right reason; and, by arguing through the opposite, only that act is of itself good whose object necessarily agrees with the agent’s act according to right reason; therefore, this act is neither of itself good nor of itself bad. For no act is good of its kind, or from its object alone, save loving God, which act has its goodness from the object alone; nor is any act bad of its kind, or from its object alone, save hating God. Hence neither of these acts is it necessary to specify or to circumstance; nor is either capable of being circumstanced. For God cannot be too much loved (understanding this of the love of friendship) nor can anyone hate God well.

18. This therefore is the first conclusion, that to will to procreate offspring is an act capable of being circumstanced with the right circumstances [= the first preceding conclusion, n.12].

β. Second Proof

19. The second conclusion [sc. the second prior conclusion, n.12] is that the first circumstance required for the moral goodness of this act is the circumstance of the end, as is universally the case in morals. And there is this circumstance in the proposition at issue: to will to procreate offspring to be religiously educated for the increasing of divine cult.

20. This is proved by reason, because perfect human operation is the end of man, Ethics 1.9-10.1099a7-9b28, 10.1.1174b18-5a1. Therefore, for this end should anyone want to have offspring.

21. This is also proved from matters of belief, because anyone should love his neighbor from charity as he loves himself, that is, for the same thing; but anyone should love himself for honest conversation and divine cult; therefore he should thus love his neighbor, and especially the offspring to whom he is especially bound.

22. This is confirmed by Augustine [in fact Lombard, Sent. IV d.31 ch.2 n.4, though they are quoted as Augustine’s by Richard of Middleton], “Not everyone,” he says, “who has offspring has the good of offspring, because the good of offspring is not said to be the offspring itself, but the hope or desire whereby offspring are sought for this, that they be religiously formed.”

23. But this circumstance does not suffice, although it is first and leads to all the others. And therefore a second circumstance follows, namely that this act ought to be between determinate persons, male and female. That it should be between male and female, this is not a circumstance but is necessarily included in the act that is the procreating of offspring; but that it be between determinate persons, this is one of the circumstances on the part of the agent causes that are due and fitting for this end - and this not only as to procreation of offspring but also as to repeated procreation of offspring (and I say ‘repeated’, because it is fitting for one man to have determinately one wife not only for procreation but also for repeated procreation, for that anyone would come together with anyone, this nature does not suffer, and in the beasts too it is not found). But that one man should be determinately of one woman is plain, for indiscriminate conjunction would be against the good of offspring (which is the end here intended), and against the good of the family, and against the good of the city.

24. The proof of the first [n.23]: because offspring would be not religiously educated on the part of parents as parents would not have determinate knowledge of their offspring - at least the father, and so he would not be solicitous about bestowing due discipline on his offspring; nor conversely would offspring bestow on the father obedience or due reverence and filial fear, and it is because of this filial fear that a son obeys the father more, and can be more easily disciplined by him than by another.

25. The second [n.23] too is proved, because the good of the family consists in a firm adhesion of the chief persons of the family; otherwise the whole thing is indiscriminate (and for this reason the Philosopher says Ethics 8.14.1162a17-19 that man is naturally a conjugal animal because a domestic animal), and neither would some persons apply diligence to the things mutually necessary for themselves or their offspring.

26. The third point [23], that it is against the good of the city, is plain, because by matrimonial contracts of this sort is friendship preserved in cities; therefore it is necessary that contracts of this sort exist between certain persons, because the friendship of citizens arises, for the most part, from determinate closeness in a definite rank. But, given this [sc. indiscriminate conjunction], there would be no known certain closeness that would be the cause of friendship; rather all closeness would be confused.

27. And therefore rightly does Aristotle criticize Socrates’ polity, Politics 2.1-2.1261a4-12, who wanted all wives to be common, because for the state of fallen nature much better is the polity he himself ordains, namely that determinate persons have determinate wives. And the indiscriminate union of male with female would be against reason for every state [of nature].

28. This circumstance too appears from things believed from Sacred Scripture, because in Genesis 2.24 it is said that “they will be two in one flesh,” and Christ sets down the same in Matthew 19.5 and St. Paul in I Corinthians 7.2, “Let each have his own wife,” supply, “on account of fornication.” And let it be that this determination is not by natural reason proved to be simply necessary in such way that its opposite would be repugnant to natural and manifest reason - at least this affirmative is sufficiently plain, that it is honorable that the persons of the Church are, for this act, determinate to each other.

29. But another circumstance, that it is honorable for those persons to be obligated to each other with an indissoluble bond for this end, is proved from the preceding one, that just as determination of persons avails for the due education of offspring and for the good of the family and the city, so too does the perpetual adhesion of determinate persons to each other avail for this same thing. And they would, because of the many occasions and difficulties that arise, not perpetually adhere to each other unless they were obligated by such an indissoluble bond to such adherence to each other.

30. And let it be that this conclusion, which is the main one in this article, could not be proved by evidently natural reason to be simply necessary; it is proved the way it is proposed, that it is honorable and consonant with natural reason for male and female to be thus obligated together for such an end.

31. From this is plain the solution to a question, namely whether such obligation belongs to the law of nature; for it was said above, in distinction 17 n.19, that most properly belonging to the law of nature is a per se known practical principle and a conclusion demonstratively following from such a principle; but belonging secondarily to the law of nature is a truth evidently consonant with such principles and conclusions, though not necessarily following from them. And in this way belongs to the law of nature that it is honorable for male and female to be obligated to the aforesaid end.

b. Proof of the Second Main Conclusion

32. For the proof of the second main conclusion [n.8], let this be the first prior conclusion: it is expedient that that indissoluble obligation arise from the act of will of the persons obligated.

33. The proof of this is that the obligation will arise either in this way or by imposition of a superior, namely the legislator. Not the second, because no law ordains or determines this woman to this man or conversely; therefore, the first. And a fitting reason is that the first is more useful and more agreeable to natural reason, because, from the fact that the obligation should be indissoluble, it is expedient that the manner in which it is done be agreeable to the indissolubility of it. But if they were compelled by a legislator to be joined together, they would be less mutually pleasing to each other, and so there would be greater occasion for future dissension; for as is said in Gratian, Decretum, p.2 cause 30 q.3 ch.4, “What someone does not choose, assuredly he does not love; but what he does not love, he easily despises.”

34. Let the second conclusion be this, that it is honorable that, in a contract of mutual giving, male and female transfer mutually to each other the power of their bodies for this end in their perpetuity.

35. This is plain from the preceding conclusion [n.32], once the reason for a contract of mutual donation is seen. For a ‘con-tract’ is said to be as it were a drawing together of two wills to each other or of two who are obligating each other; and consequently it necessarily requires acts of will that agree in a mutual transfer, as in the case of other exchanges or sellings (taking ‘selling’ commonly). Nor does this suffice, but it is necessary for these acts to be expressed by certain signs, otherwise there would be no certainly for either about the act of will of the other. Also, neither wants to make a transfer to the other save to the extent each conceives the other to want to make a transfer to them.

36. So if, from the preceding conclusion [n.32], it is expedient for them to be obligated through their own wills, and not without signs (expressing or expressed), then it is expedient that there be a contract there from which the obligation arises. But this contract can only be one of mutual giving or interchange (which is the same thing) of power over their bodies for this end in their perpetuity; because power over one’s body, which is one’s own power, is not transferred by anyone to another save by act of will, because by that act he was lord and ceases to be lord and makes another to be lord. And consequently, the right that the other acquires over this one’s body when it is transferred to him is by an act of will freely transferring it - and this along with an extrinsic evident sign from which is obtained the idea of the aforesaid contract. And this contract is called ‘I give if you give’ or ‘I give so that you may give’.

37. This mutual transfer of lordship of bodies is plain according to the rule of the Apostle in I Corinthians 7.4, “The woman does not have power of her own body but the man; and the man does not have power of his own body but the woman;” and thus does each have power over the body of the other and over their own by reason of the mutual giving and the mutual contract - and this as to the act of the body that regards procreation of offspring.

c. Proof of the Third Main Conclusion

38. Proof of the third main conclusion [n.9] as follows: no persons would obligate themselves, at least not commonly, to so difficult an obligation unless there were some stricture in place, either a law of nature or a divine or human positive law. Every other licit contract is instituted or at least approved by law, because the correctness of such a contract or obligation is not a practical principle. So there is requirement that the rightness of this sort of contract be approved as a right obligation, or that this sort of contract be instituted or perceived as right.

39. But the law of nature, although it does obligate to the indissolubility of the aforesaid bond on the premise of such contract, is however not a very evident law of nature but is said in a secondary way. And what belongs to the law of nature only in a secondary way is not manifest to everyone. Therefore, it is expedient for the necessity of the precept to be determined by positive law.

40. But no legislator is above the whole of the human species save God alone; therefore it is expedient that the precept be approved or instituted or prescribed by the legislator who is God. For those things that are remote from the practical principles of the law of nature are not apparent to everyone in the way the practical principles are that are known to everyone, because they are not explicated and because other legislators do not know how to explicate such things. Therefore, it is expedient to explicate them through him who is universal Legislator over human nature.

41. Let it be too that a precept of the law of nature said in the primary way (namely a manifest practical principle or conclusion) would have obligated for this purpose; still it would be expedient for a divine precept to be set down for it, because men obey less the law alone of nature than they do God giving a precept, because they fear and revere their own consciences less than they do divine authority.

42. Nor is it expedient that this determination be done in the first way by the human positive law, because human positive laws vary among diverse peoples, and this indissolubility should be uniform among all.

43. Now this was done in Genesis 2.24 and Matthew 19.4, where Christ relates that God said what Adam pronounced in Genesis 2.24 [“man and wife shall be one flesh”], because God spoke through the mouth of Adam as of a herald; and     therefore Christ adds that God has united (supply: male and female) in a matrimonial union by the precept by which he pronounced it through the mouth of Adam, “a man shall cleave to his wife etc     .”

44. But one needs to understand that to prescribe the contract is one thing, and to prescribe perpetual cleaving on the premise of the contract is another.

For it was expedient for the first to be prescribed for the time for which there was a necessity of propagation, and especially if men were troublesome with respect to it without a precept. But for another time, for which there is no necessity, it has no need to be prescribed. Therefore, after the Fall God gave the precept twice about making the contract, first in Genesis 2.24, and again, when men had been destroyed by the Flood, in Genesis 9.1, 7.

But it is expedient for the second precept to be given for all time, because it was shown, in the first conclusion [nn.7, 12-13] that the indissolubility is consonant with the law of nature, and it will be less preserved unless, over and above this, there is a precept.

45. For this conclusion there is set down the following sort of reason: no one can obligate some owner’s property to owneer lord save by the consent and approval of him whose it is; but the body of anyone belongs by right of creation to God; therefore no one can transfer it to the ownership of another save insofar as God approves. Therefore, if the transfer is honorable for this end (as is plain from the first and second main conclusions [nn.7-8]), it follows that it is fitting that God approves this transfer of bodies.

46. But it would be said here that although a man be bound to God by creation in everything he can do, yet God does not exact so much of man; rather he freely leaves him to himself, demanding of him only that he keep the precepts of the Decalogue. Hence one can indeed sell oneself into slavery (although there is no special approval of this found in Scripture), in which selling one transfers ownership and power of one’s body to another as one does in the contracting of matrimony; the like is plain about the transfer of ownership of all one’s property. And the whole reason is because that in which God does not obligate a man or what is his own he leaves to man’s will.

d. Proof of the Fourth Main Conclusion

47. For the fourth conclusion [n.10] let this be the first special prior conclusion: it is fitting that to the aforesaid contract be annexed the conferring of grace, because the aforesaid contract is difficult, since from it arises a very difficult obligation. This is also apparent because of the many miseries and infirmities in which they are bound to serve each other until death. And therefore, as far as this is concerned, there is a greater difficulty here than in Religion. Now the difficulty of it is connected to the honor of it (which was proved earlier [nn.29-30]); and for doing what is honorable, as for doing what is difficult, it is fitting for grace to be conferred. This contract too needs grace because of the difficulty that is in this act, wherein the mind is much distracted from God.

48. The second conclusion: that it is fitting that this grace is regularly conferred under some special sensible sign, instituted for this purpose by God. For such a sensible sign is more keenly asked for by us and more recognized; and it is necessary for us first to know grace and afterwards to desire it. From which it follows that such a sensible sign can reasonably and fittingly be instituted for signifying the grace legitimately conferred on the contracting parties.

49. The third conclusion: it is expedient that some sacrament properly so called be conjoined with the aforesaid contract. It is plain from the two preceding conclusions [nn.47-48] that it be an efficacious sign of the grace then conferred. But one must understand that, by bracketing consideration of the idea of a sacrament, the truths about matrimony in the matter at hand can commonly be shown by reason of contract and obligation.

50. Now this annexed idea of a sacrament seems to introduce many new difficulties, as: by whom and when it was instituted; what form and how it is one; who is the minister and how he is one; and what the effect is of the sacrament.

51. About the first [sc. ‘by whom’]: it cannot be said that the sacrament of matrimony was established in the state of innocence, Genesis 2.7-8, 18-25, because all the sacraments have their efficacy from the passion of Christ displayed and foreseen; but if the state of innocence had endured, the passion of Christ would not have been displayed or foreseen. Nor does it appear that it is a sacrament of the Mosaic Law. Nor is there found in the Evangelical Law where it was instituted. For Christ in Matthew 19.4-6 approves what was instituted in Genesis 2.24, and Paul 1 Corinthians 7.2-4 taught that thus is the act or use that follows the contract of matrimony.

52. Someone therefore might say that what is said in Ephesians 5.32, “This is a great sacrament, I speak in Christ and in the Church,” is understood about a sacrament taken in an extended sense and for sign of a sacred thing, of which, however, it is not cause or efficacious sign. For matrimony is not an efficacious sign in respect of union with Christ, but it is an efficacious sign in a way; so can a vow of virginity be an efficacious sign of union with Christ.

53. Because, however, the Church commonly holds the sacrament of matrimony to be the seventh among the ecclesiastical sacraments, and “one is not to think otherwise of the sacraments than the Roman Church thinks,” Gregory IX, Decretals V tit.7 ch.9, ‘About heretics’, therefore can it be said that God has annexed to the contract of matrimony a sacrament properly speaking, at least for the Gospel Law; otherwise it would not be a sacrament of the New Law. And then it is necessary to say that it was instituted by Christ, as was universally said above about the ecclesiastical sacraments [Ord. IV d.2 nn.18-26].

54. But the ‘when’ is not found more plainly than in Matthew 19.4-6. And although there Christ only approved the contract instituted in Genesis 2.18-24, and consequently he did not institute that contract, yet he did institute the sacrament. This can be taken from the word that he added [Matthew ibid.], “What God has joined, let not man put asunder,” so that it not be understood precisely that God joined them by instituting the contract of matrimony, but that he joined them from then on with grace through the institution, conjoined with the contract, of a concomitant sacrament.

55. Now the form is some sensible sign, instituted by God for signifying efficaciously the grace then conferred.

56. But here there is a doubt: for either God instituted as indeterminate a sign to be a sacrament of grace as the sign is indeterminate that is required for the contract, or God has determined the sign that has to be the efficacious sign of grace more than is the sufficient sign for the contract determined by human imposition. And if the latter, either he has determined some words precisely, as “I accept you for my wife” or “for my husband,” or he has determined indifferently any words at all expressing the concept of consent.

57. And between these three members there is considerable difference; because if this one be held very strictly, namely that the form of this sacrament consist in these words precisely, it follows that on many occasions there is a contract of matrimony without a sacrament, even in the Evangelical Law, because on many occasions the contract is made through other words than these. If too he has determined the words but any words indifferently that are expressive of mutual consent, still, since sometimes there is a contract (as between mutes) without words, it follows that in some places there is a contract of matrimony without a sacrament. Nor is this absurd, because it is probable that up to the Evangelical Law matrimony was frequently contracted where however there never was a sacrament as we now speak of it, namely in the proper sense. Mutes according to this, therefore, are truly spouses, because there is a true contract between mutes. And grace is given there not by force of the sacrament, but just as grace is given to the truly penitent without expression of words, not by force of the sacrament but by force of merit and contrition, so between the mute there is a true contract, and grace is given without a sacrament.

58. But if God has not determined the sign to be a sacrament of grace more than is determined by human imposition to be sufficient for a contract, then it can be said that in the case of any contract in the Evangelical Law a sacrament is concomitant, because the sign that is required for the contract is by divine institution a sacrament. The Church, however, has determined that the sacrament is done only through words.

Thus is the third point plain [sc. the form, n.50].

59. But how is the form one? Because it is one by unity of integrity, not by unity of indivisibility; for the words, expressive of consent on this side and that, are one integral sign both with respect to the contract and with respect to grace. Nor is it unacceptable that several partial forms are one sacrament, as was said above of the Eucharist about the words over the bread and wine [Ord. IV d.8 nn.60-62].

60. About the minister [n.50] there is another doubt because, for the most part, the contracting parties themselves minister this sacrament to themselves, either mutually or each to themself. But neither is this necessarily required if with every contract of matrimony there is a sacrament, for sometimes the fathers contract on behalf of a son and daughter who are present without expressing their own signs; if there is a sacrament there, one must say that the minister of the sacrament can indifferently be whoever can be a minister in a contract of matrimony.

61. But then how is the minister one? It can be said as was said above about one form [n.59].

62. But what is the effect [n.50]? I reply: two graces in the souls of the contracting parties, and this unless there is an obstacle - supply, mortal sin here, there. For it is not sufficient to receive grace that the contracting party is not feigning with respect to the sacrament, but it is necessary that there be penitence first, because this sacrament does not give first grace. But there is one total and first effect, namely the graced union of hearts.

63. But if the form is to be restricted to a certain sign and to determinate ministers, one must consequently say that not all those who contract [matrimony] in the Christian Law receive grace; and yet it can be said that they do receive grace if there is not otherwise an obstacle, because God assists there on account of the difficulty of honorable contract - not however as much grace as they receive with the sacrament, especially had an impossibility not existed.

e. Proof of the Fifth Main Conclusion

64. About the fifth conclusion [n.11], which applies to the terms; I mean that matrimony is one thing, the contract of matrimony is another, and the sacrament of matrimony another.

65. For matrimony is the mutual obligation or the bond that was spoken about in the first main conclusion [n.7]. And the contract is the mutual act of wills, which was spoken about in the second main conclusion [n.8]. The sacrament is the efficacious sign of grace, accompanying the act, which sacrament was spoken about in the fourth main conclusion [n.10].

66. And the distinction between them is plain:

For the first is permanent in the souls of the spouses. And it is either a real relation coming from outside or, which seems truer, a relation of reason only, because there is nothing there save a new lordship and a new service through a new exchange; but such lordship or servitude posits nothing real in the lord or servant.

67. The second exists only in coming to be, and it is an interior or exterior act or undergoing of act, or rather something consisting in the interior and exterior acts of two persons. And this is related to matrimony in the first way stated [n.66] as the cause in its coming to be, the way generation is to paternity, or rather the way ‘to be baptized’ or ‘to be ordained’ is to character, as is plain above from d.8 [rather Ord. IV d.6 nn.277, 317].

68. And the third likewise consists in coming to be, and it simultaneously is and is not with the second; and so it does not remain always with the first.

69. Nor should one say that this name ‘matrimony’ is equivocal as to these three, but rather that it signifies only the first, and it is taken for the others only indirectly, signifying something else, so that for the second this is the contract of matrimony and for the third it is the sacrament of matrimony, where the construction is not intransitive but transitive.Transitive in the sense that the contract and sacrament of matrimony are not what matrimony is but what ‘pass over’ [transit] to what matrimony is, by making it (the contract) or gracing it (the sacrament). Matrimony proper is the bond [nn.65, 71] so made and graced. ⁷⁷

70. But if you altogether contend that the name ‘matrimony’ signify these three things, there will be no contention about the name, which in this case will be equivocal.

71. Now these three can be described as follows:

Matrimony is the indissoluble bond between male and female, arising from the mutual transfer of the power of their bodies to each other, made for procreating offspring to be duly educated.

72. The second as follows:

The contract of matrimony is the male’s and female’s mutual transfer of their bodies, in their perpetuity, for procreating offspring to be duly educated.

73. The third as follows:

The sacrament of matrimony is the male’s and female’s expression of certain words to each other, words signifying the handing over of the mutual power of their bodies for duly procreating offspring, by divine institution efficaciously signifying the conferring of grace on the contracting parties, for the mutual graced union of hearts.

Or if certain words are not precisely the form of this sacrament, nor the contracting parties precisely the ministers, let there be put at the beginning, in place of the ‘expression of certain words’, the ‘exhibiting of certain signs of both male and female’ or something more general, as ‘the exhibiting of signs signifying the mutual handing over of the bodies of male and female for the due procreation of offspring etc.’

B. The Application of the Aforesaid to the Question

74. Hereby is the answer clear by application to the question -

The contract, indeed, of matrimony [n.72] was instituted by God, Genesis 2.24, “This now is bone of my bones,” 1.28, “Increase and multiply;” and after the Fall 3.16, “I will multiply your conceptions and your sorrows,” said God to Eve; and Genesis 9.1, “Increase and multiply,” he said to Noah and his family. And the institution is by way of affirmative precept, so that it is always binding but not at all times but for time of necessity - not only at the beginning, but it seems to obligate still in the same way if a like paucity were for some reason to come about, as from war or plague or disaster and the like. And this proves how the contract was instituted by God through divine and positive law, and by his similarly impressing the law of nature on the hearts of men, to which law of nature does this contract belong, if not completely as known of necessity, yet as secondarily consonant with it.

75. The second part, namely indissoluble obligation [n.71], God instituted by his positive law, Genesis 2.24, “He will cleave to his wife” - ‘will cleave’, I say, not ‘momentarily accept’. God also instituted it by impress of the law of nature, not only as to things that are known evidently from the same law but as to those that are evidently consonant with that law. And that he did so institute it is proved at the beginning of the third man conclusion [nn.39-43]. Now this second precept has the force of a negative precept, because it obligates always and at all times, unless a special dispensation be made by the Legislator, as will be said below in d.33 nn.15-21.

76. He instituted also the third part, namely the sacrament of matrimony [n.73], as was said in the fourth main conclusion [nn.47-50].

77. But there is here a doubt when the reasonableness of the contract of matrimony, and of the obligation, and the divine institution of it are obtained from all these conclusions, and from the solution, only because of this end, namely to procreate offspring to be duly educated. And this institution is said to have been instituted as a duty. But, besides this, matrimony is also said to have been instituted as a remedy, namely for avoiding incontinence after the Fall. How, first, is the honorableness of the contract or of the obligation obtained in this way? Or how is there divine institution or approval of it for this end?

78. I reply: it does not appear an easy thing that anyone should, according to right reason, use this act precisely for pleasure; indeed, the opposite seems more consonant with reason. Therefore, this is more something to be tolerated; because nothing laudable seems to be found in the act save procreation of offspring. Natural reason too does not seem to establish any honorableness in the act, nor consequently in the obligation or in the mutual obligatory contract for the act, nor consequently to establish that the Legislator should rightly approve or institute such contract or obligation.

79. What then if it be said that someone who wants to use his body for this delight, so that he not use it unjustly with someone not his own, can make exchange of his body with the body of another which he may justly use as his own, and then this giving is honorable because of this justice? Also, on the presupposition that such an end is licit, it will not then be necessary that, in order to use it licitly, he use it for such act by the license of God, because (as was said when excluding the reason for the third main conclusion [n.46]), God committed to each one his own self and his own property, wherein he did not obligate him specifically to himself. If this answer not satisfy, nor is justice for this act more praiseworthy than a just exchange is for another act that would not be praiseworthy (as an exchange to use something else for a similar use elsewhere), at least can, conversely, recourse be had here to a divine institution that is not based on the praiseworthiness of an act for an end other than propagation, but based on infirmity after the Fall for avoiding a greater evil. And, having allowed this indulgence, he instituted a contract ordained for it - if not by the impress of the law of nature, at least by positive law; and this both as to contract and as to obligation.

80. But it is difficult to find the ‘when’ in between as concerns the contract for the first end, because never in the Old Testament is there found a contract prescribed or praised save for procreation of offspring; for always the divine command is for this, “Increase,” which is only by propagating. At least in the New Testament we are informed that this contract is indulged for another end, namely avoidance of fornication, I Corinthians 7.6, “But this I say according to indulgence etc.,” and it is likely that such an obligation would not first have been made in the New Law, but from the beginning of human law.

81. So then, from the first conclusions is obtained the result about the institution of the contract of matrimony, and about obligation in order to procreate offspring, and also about the institution of the sacrament accompanying the contract. But the institution of this contract for avoiding fornication is not so obtained by natural reason, indeed scarcely as something permitted by divine institution. Justice there as to indissolubility, however, and the sacrament accompanying the contract, are made clear in the same way as previously about matrimony instituted for the first end [nn.7-30].

82. To the first argument [n.3] the answer is plain from the third conclusion [n.9], that Adam pronounced as herald the words “This is bone of my bones etc.,” as is manifestly expressed by Christ in Matthew 19.4-6, when speaking about God who made them male and female he said, “Wherefore a man will cleave etc.” For if Adam had instituted matrimony and had not just been the herald and minister of God who did the instituting, Adam could have revoked matrimony - which is not true.

83. As to the second [n.4], I believe that no one inferior to God can change anything in what is essential to the contract of matrimony (on the presupposition of suitable matter), or about matrimony when a firm and ratified contract has been made. But the Church does sometimes well make changes as to fitting and unfitting matter, by ordaining what matters should and what should not make a contract; for so does the Church do about the matter of penitence, subjecting this man to this priest as subject to him and not to another; but about the virtue or sacrament of penitence the Church cannot change anything.